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Abstract
Payday loans are used by millions of Americans every year despite their annu-
alized interest rates of several hundred percent. We provide new evidence on 
the consequences of payday borrowing and the determinants of personal bank-
ruptcy. Using an administrative panel data set of loan records in a regression- 
discontinuity design, we estimate that payday loans increase personal bank-
ruptcy rates by a factor of two. We assess possible mechanisms and find the 
most support for a novel one: payday loan access appears to induce bankruptcy 
filings by worsening the cash flow position of the household.
1. Introduction
Usury laws are often adopted to restrict high-interest lending such as payday 
loans. With annual percentage rates (APRs) of 400–600 percent, payday loans 
carry some of the highest interest rates available on formal credit products. De-
spite this, about 10 million American households borrow using payday loans 
each year, and payday lenders have more storefronts in the United States than 
McDonald’s and Starbucks combined (Pew Charitable Trusts 2012; Lusardi and 
de Bassa Scheresberg 2013).
This paper contributes new evidence on both the impact of payday loan access 
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and the causes of personal bankruptcy. We use an administrative panel data set 
from a lender and a discontinuity in the lender’s underwriting rule to study the 
impact of payday loans on bankruptcy filings. The administrative panel includes 
information about the timing, size, and locations of applications as well as  demo-
graphics for 145,000 applicants. Individual identifiers in the administrative data 
permit matching to bankruptcy petitions that are available from the Public Ac-
cess to Court Electronic Records (PACER) database.
An institutional feature of the lender’s underwriting process then allows sta-
tistical identification of the impact of payday loans on bankruptcy using a 
regression- discontinuity analysis. Payday loan applications are approved if the 
applicant’s credit score exceeds a fixed threshold. Regression- discontinuity anal-
yses rely on unobservable characteristics not changing discontinuously at the 
threshold.1 With this standard identifying assumption, differences in bankruptcy 
rates between barely approved and barely rejected applicants can be attributed to 
the causal impact of payday loan access.2
Our estimates answer the paper’s title question affirmatively: yes, access to pay-
day loans causes a significant increase in personal bankruptcy rates. The bench-
mark point estimate corresponds to a near doubling of the annual bankruptcy 
rate, with other specifications ranging between increases of 21 and 185 percent. 
Regression-discontinuity results can sometimes be fragile, so we show exactly 
how our findings depend on implementation choices, demonstrating robustness 
and allowing readers to focus on their preferred specifications for quantitative 
takeaways.
Even at the low end of the estimate range, the magnitudes we find are striking: 
payday loan principals average about $300, but access has an economically sig-
nificant effect on bankruptcy, a cumulative financial outcome. We therefore view 
the remainder of the paper, which complements the main bankruptcy impact 
analysis by extensively evaluating a series of possible mechanisms, as a second 
essential contribution. This investigation of mechanisms also contextualizes the 
paper within the literature on the determinants of bankruptcy.
A variety of forces have been implicated as drivers of bankruptcy-filing rates, 
including the pecuniary benefits of debt discharge (Fay, Hurst, and White 2002), 
stigma (Gross and Souleles 2002), the expansion of credit card indebtedness 
(Domowitz and Sartain 1999; White 2007), adverse health and medical expense 
shocks (Himmelstein et al. 2009; Morrison et al. 2013), and the ability to pay fil-
ing costs (Mann and Porter 2010; Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang 2014). We find 
evidence for a complementary force, which to our knowledge is novel in this lit-
erature: payday loans increase bankruptcy rates by worsening borrowers’ cash 
flow positions.
1 For econometric foundations of the regression-discontinuity approach, see Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell (1960), Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), Porter (2003), and McCrary (2008). 
Many modern applications stem from Angrist and Lavy (1999). Imbens and Lemieux (2008) pro-
vide a practical guide.
2 For convenience, we refer to approval of one’s first payday loan application, conditional on ap-
plying, as the effect of payday loan access.
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Using individual-level variation3 (rather than the typical changes in state reg-
ulatory environments or zip-code-level and county-level shocks), we are able to 
contribute new evidence on the effects of high-interest credit.4 Other analyses of 
the effects of payday loan access include Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), Zinman 
(2010), Melzer (2011), Morse (2011), Morgan, Strain, and Seblani (2012), Car-
rell and Zinman (2014), Bhutta (2014), Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015), and 
Carter and Skimmyhorn (2017). Caskey (2012) reviews the mixed collection of 
findings in this literature, and we contextualize our contribution in Section 6.1. 
This unique, large-scale, matched database and our individual-level identification 
strategy allow us to explore the microeconomic channels through which credit 
affects consumers, which complements the rich literature that identifies market- 
level impacts of credit.
It is sometimes suggested that the central policy question is whether payday 
loans suck borrowers into a downward spiral of financial distress. The answer 
we come to in this paper is nuanced and involves a reframing of the question. 
We find the empirical evidence compelling that payday loan access causes per-
sonal bankruptcy rates to increase. The mechanism supported most strongly is 
that the bankruptcies could arise because of the cash flow burden of pressing pay-
day finance charges. Additional theoretical work, beyond the scope of this paper, 
should investigate whether this household cash flow mechanism is or is not con-
sistent with a downward-spiral view. Beyond these considerations, it could be the 
case that the bankruptcy filings benefit the filers, providing a fresh start following 
their longstanding financial distress. Bankruptcy filings also cause other debt to 
become delinquent, which distorts equilibrium interest rates for those who are 
not payday borrowers. Instead of further discussing a possible downward spi-
ral, we therefore attempt in Section 6.2 to seriously analyze the private and social 
costs and benefits of bankruptcy filings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide 
additional background on payday loans and introduce the administrative data. 
Section 3 describes our estimation strategy, focusing on the credit-score discon-
tinuity. We present our main empirical results and robustness checks in Section 
4 and discuss mechanisms driving those results in Section 5. Section 6 examines 
the implications and relates our work to previous literature, and Section 7 con-
cludes.
3 Among the vast literature in economics on borrowing and credit, there is relatively little em-
pirical research on the causal impact of individual-level random variation in the ability to borrow 
money, as in this paper. Excellent exceptions are Ausubel (1999) and Gross and Souleles (2002) on 
credit cards and Karlan and Zinman (2008, 2009, 2010) on South African consumer credit.
4 Payday loans are often described as a form of “fringe banking” (Caskey 1994). Like check- 
cashing services and pawnshops, payday lenders provide alternatives to traditional banks. Caskey 
(1991, 1994, 2001, 2005, 2012) examines fringe banking in great detail, Flannery and Samolyk (2005) 
analyze the profitability of the payday-lending industry, Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001) conduct 
surveys of payday borrowers, and Stegman and Faris (2003) review the payday loan industry’s busi-
ness practices.
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2. Context and Data
Administrative data were supplied for this project by a provider of financial 
services that offers payday loans. To apply for a payday loan at this company, 
individuals fill out paper applications and present their most recent pay stubs, 
checking account statements, utility or phone bills, and state-issued photo identi-
fication cards. The lender uses applicants’ pay stubs to infer the dates of their next 
paydays and assign loan due dates. Loans are collateralized only with personal 
checks dated on borrowers’ upcoming paydays.5 Finance charges equal 18 per-
cent of the loan’s principal. The 2-week loan term that is most common implies 
an APR of 18 percent × 26 = 468 percent, since people who are paid biweekly 
receive 26 paychecks per year.6
We study the universe of individuals whose first loan application at the com-
pany occurred at an outlet in Texas between September 2000 (when the firm en-
tered that market) and August 2004. This includes about 1 million loan applica-
tions from 145,159 individuals. Table 1 presents demographic and background 
characteristics of this population and summary information about their appli-
cations and loans.7 There is variation in the availability of the background char-
acteristics, mostly because of changes over time in the data collection and data 
retention practices by the lender.8
Overall, the available observables align with the broader population of payday 
borrowers (see, for example, Elliehausen and Lawrence 2001). Table 1 also re-
ports summary statistics for a subgroup of 31,892 applicants on which we focus 
in some of the empirical analysis whose credit score is within .5 standard devia-
tions of the passing payday loan credit-score threshold. We describe this thresh-
old in detail in Section 3.1.
Summary statistics for the bankruptcy data are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Personal bankruptcy petitions are in the public record and were downloaded 
from PACER. We obtained the universe of 556,767 personal bankruptcy filings 
5 The longstanding practice of some employers providing advances against upcoming paychecks 
is distinct from the topic studied here: payday lenders do not directly garnish future paychecks to 
obtain loan repayment.
6 Payday lenders typically do not allow interest to compound, but an alternative measure of the 
annualized cost of liquidity from biweekly payday loans is 100 × (1.1826 − 1) = 7,295 percent.
7 All dollar values are deflated with the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers to Janu-
ary 2002 dollars. We replace the top and bottom .1 percent of the distributions of checking account 
balance and take-home pay with signifiers for missing data. We also replace age with a signifier for 
missing data if it is less than 18.
8 For the data extract we use, the company stopped collecting some work-related variables in Au-
gust 2003, namely, job tenure, pay frequency, and income. It had, in December 2002, stopped col-
lecting information on wage garnishment and homeownership. This means that only a few observa-
tions (less than 2 percent) are missing those control variables for reasons that are uncorrelated with 
the time effects that we control for in all the paper’s specifications. The firm that provided the data 
also offers pawn loans. Data on race and sex are collected incidentally since all of the information 
on drivers’ licenses is recorded in accordance with pawnbroking underwriting rules. Those variables 
are therefore available in our data only for people who had pawned an item at the company prior to 
their first payday loan application. Thus, missing values for race and sex are perfectly correlated with 
a dummy for not having previously taken a pawn loan at this company. We include that dummy 
variable in all specifications below.
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in the four US bankruptcy courts in Texas from 2000 through 2006.9 These bank-
ruptcy data include the date of filing, the chapter (7 or 13),10 the disposition of 
9 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) modified 
US bankruptcy law substantially. It was enacted on April 20, 2005, and became effective 6 months 
later. We lack statistical power to draw clear conclusions about the interaction of BAPCPA and pay-
day loan access. Most applicants for payday loans we study have incomes low enough that they meet 
the (more stringent) post-BAPCPA means-test criterion for a Chapter 7 filing.
10 Filing under Chapter 7 generally results in a full discharge of debt obligations. Filing under 
Chapter 13 entails a reorganization of debts. Below we discuss in more detail the important differ-
ences.
Table 2
Texas Bankruptcy Totals, 2000–2006
Bankruptcies
Annual Personal 
Bankruptcy Rate
Filers Who 
Ever Applied
Petitions per 
Applicant  
per Year
Chapter 7 311,864 .205 3,903 .384
Chapter 13 244,903 .161 9,637 .948
All 556,767 .366 13,540 1.333
Note. The data are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) 
database. The Texas-wide personal bankruptcy rate is calculated using PACER bank-
ruptcy data and population data from the Census Bureau. Bankruptcy rates among 
payday loan applicants are calculated by matching administrative data from a pay-
day lender to individual bankruptcy filings in PACER, using first names, last names, 
zip codes, and the final four digits of social security numbers.
Table 3
Payday Loan Applicants’ Bankruptcy Rates
All Credit Scores
Within .5 SD of 
Approval Threshold
Within .05 SD of 
Approval Threshold
Below Above Below Above Below Above
Within 1 year after first 
application:
 Chapter 7 .41 .69 .37 .51 .36 .41
 Chapter 13 1.62 1.94 1.49 1.55 1.46 2.91
 Chapter 13 and dismissed 1.03 1.07 .91 .98 .95 1.74
 All 2.03 2.63 1.86 2.06 1.82 3.32
Within 2 years after first 
application:
 Chapter 7 .60 1.17 .55 .83 .44 .82
 Chapter 13 2.53 3.31 2.30 2.55 2.63 4.14
 Chapter 13 and dismissed 1.51 1.71 1.31 1.56 1.46 2.20
 All 3.13 4.48 2.84 3.38 3.07 4.95
Applicants 25,305 119,854 11,320 20,572 1,370 1,958
N 145,159 31,892 3,328
Note. Bankruptcy rates are calculated by matching administrative data from a payday lender to indi-
vidual bankruptcy filings in PACER, using first names, last names, zip codes, and the final four digits 
of social security numbers. Two-year rates are not annualized.
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the bankruptcy case (generally, dismissal or discharge of debts),11 and individual 
identifiers that permit linkage to the payday loan data.
Table 2 shows an individual bankruptcy rate (as a fraction of population) for 
Texas of .366 percent per year.12 We identify debtors in the PACER bankruptcy 
data as payday loan applicants if the following variables in the two data sets match 
exactly: first name, last name, zip code of home residence, and last four digits of 
the social security number. By these criteria, 13,540 of the 145,519 applicants filed 
for personal bankruptcy during the bankruptcy sample period. Thus, the annual 
bankruptcy rate among payday applicants is 13,540/(145,519 × 7) = 1.33 percent 
per year, more than 3.5 times the overall annual rate in Texas from 2000 to 2006. 
This average difference is also displayed over time in Online Appendix Figure 
OA1.
Table 3 provides summary information about the fraction of applicants above 
and below the credit threshold who subsequently filed for bankruptcy. These av-
erages imply that people above the credit-score threshold are more likely to file. 
This is true for the full sample and for samples of .5 and .05 standard deviations 
around the threshold. These differences are suggestive of a relationship between 
payday lending and bankruptcy. For more thorough analysis, next we turn to re-
gressions that exploit the discontinuous access to payday loans near the credit- 
score threshold.
3. Identification and Empirical Strategy
3.1. The Credit-Score Regression Discontinuity
Access to payday loans depends on a credit score calculated at the time of the 
loan application by the third-party credit bureau Teletrack.13 During our observa-
tion period, the lender maintained a fairly strict threshold rule for loan approvals. 
Among first-time applicants with scores below the threshold, 99.6 percent were 
rejected, while 96.9 percent of first-time applicants scoring above the threshold 
were approved. The threshold rule did change during our sample period. We dis-
cuss the effects of this change in Section 4.3. In most of the empirical analysis, we 
pool the data and use the variable Credit Score, which equals the raw Teletrack 
score minus the approval threshold that was in force at the time of the applica-
11 We focus primarily on bankruptcy petitions and secondarily on whether debt was eventually 
discharged; filing is an indicator of financial distress (Fay, Hurst, and White 2002). Bankruptcy law 
precludes creditors from contacting debtors once a petition is filed, so debtors may file to protect 
themselves from creditors even if their debts are unlikely to be discharged. Hereafter, we use the 
terms “petition” and “filing” interchangeably.
12 Population data are from Census Bureau, Table 1: Annual Estimates of the Population for the 
United States and States, and for Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2005 (https://www2.census 
.gov/programs-surveys/popest/tables/2000-2005/state/totals/nst-est2005-01.xls).
13 The credit-scoring formula is proprietary, but in personal communications with Teletrack 
personnel we were told these scores differ from Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) scores in that they 
depend on a shorter history of behavior and focus on borrowing in the subprime market. Though 
Teletrack serves major payday lenders, the lenders establish their own criteria for approving loan 
applications. In other work (Skiba and Tobacman 2008; Agarwal, Skiba, and Tobacman 2009), we 
discuss more details of the credit-scoring process in the context of the profitability of payday lenders.
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tion, normalized by the standard deviation of raw scores during the correspond-
ing period. Figure 1 displays a histogram of Credit Score, which indicates that 
there is discreteness in the distribution but no unusual bunching in proximity to 
the threshold.
Consistent with the company’s stated policy, the credit score has a discontin-
uous effect on the probability that a payday loan application is approved. Figure 
2 shows the probability of approval among first-time applicants (Approved) as a 
function of Credit Score. Two quartic polynomials, fit independently to the data 
on either side of the credit-score threshold, are superimposed on the graphs. We 
quantify this visually striking discontinuity by regressing Approved on an indi-
cator for being above the threshold (AboveThr), controlling for a polynomial in 
Credit Score and background characteristics:
  b b g d e¢ ¢= + + + + +X0 1 ,Approved AboveThr (( Credit S )1 core) i i i i ti if M  (1)
where Xi is a vector for borrower i of all the demographic and background char-
acteristics provided by the company and reported in Table 1 and ¢tiM  is a full set 
of dummies for the month-year of the first payday loan application, so ¢tiM  equals 
one if individual i’s first application was in month t and zero otherwise. A variety 
of choices can be made for the functional form of f(Credit Scorei), and we adopt 
Figure 1. Distribution of Teletrack scores
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an agnostic approach. Our benchmark specifications allow f(∙) to be a quartic in 
Credit Scorei interacted with AboveThri.14
Informal default is common on payday loans: at this firm, over 30 percent of 
borrowers had a loan written off by the lender within a year of taking their first 
loans. In choosing the threshold for loan approval, the company therefore had in-
centives disconnected from bankruptcy-filing probabilities. To the extent that the 
company adjusted its threshold to decrease loan losses due to borrowers’ bank-
ruptcy filings, the bankruptcy rate should fall when crossing the threshold, which 
would bias our findings downward.
3.2. Identification
The identifying assumption for the regression-discontinuity design is that un-
observables must not change discontinuously at the threshold. This assumption is 
not directly testable, but two main avenues are available for gaining insight about 
14 Table OA1 in the Online Appendix reports linear probability and probit estimates of equation 
(1) based on this specification. In every regression, the coefficient on AboveThr is highly significant 
and close to 1. The R2-value equals .90 when only AboveThr is included on the right-hand side. As 
the subsequent columns add a quartic in Credit Score fully interacted with AboveThr, the demo-
graphics listed above, and the dummies for month of first payday loan application, the coefficient on 
AboveThr hardly changes, and the R2-value increases by only 1 percent. Results from probit equa-
tions (showing marginal effects) reveal the same pattern.
Figure 2. Probability of approval by credit score
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it. The first avenue relates to observable characteristics. If observables do not 
change discontinuously at the threshold, that is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
guarantee that unobservables also do not, but it increases our confidence. Figure 
OA2 plots the 16 control variables from Table 1 versus Credit Score and indicates 
reasonable but imperfect balance. Table OA2 in the Online Appendix provides 
further information about balance across the threshold. It shows that the balance 
of the raw variables improves as the range around the threshold shrinks; it also 
shows estimates of the discontinuities using the same approach we use to esti-
mate the bankruptcy effects of interest below.
Imbalances are most pronounced for age, checking account balance, and 
months at current residence, all of which are modestly higher above the credit 
score threshold. Manipulation of these types of covariates to get over the thresh-
old would be problematic: applicants successful at this kind of manipulation 
could also be successful at navigating the bankruptcy-filing process, for example.
We view this type of manipulation as unlikely for the checking account bal-
ances, which are measured with bank statements, but possible with the (unveri-
fied) variable measuring months at current residence. Were borrowers to know 
the impact that this has on loan access, they might wait until a sufficient amount 
of time has elapsed to apply for a loan.
Encouragingly, there is no difference in the discontinuity on the basis of 
whether people have multiple applications on the same day as their first applica-
tion (some people reapply immediately after being rejected). It does not appear 
that applicants and the lender are trying to adjust underwriting variables in real 
time to gain approval.
Reassuringly for our strategy, the particular directions of imbalances we ob-
serve across the threshold in Table OA2 and Figure OA2 usually would induce 
omitted-variables bias that would go against our bankruptcy findings below. For 
example, above-threshold applicants have slightly higher checking account bal-
ances and residential stability.
Moreover, institutional features of the underwriting process increase our con-
fidence in the exogeneity of AboveThri conditional on f(Credit Scorei) for first-
time applicants. First, during the application process, the payday loan compa-
ny’s employee submits information about the applicant electronically to the 
 company’s central servers, which in turn send a query to Teletrack. Within min-
utes, a notification of whether the application was approved or declined is re-
turned to the employee. Neither applicants nor the employees in the store are 
informed of the applicants’ scores or the passing credit-score threshold. Second, 
Teletrack uses additional information from other lenders, which is not available 
to this lender’s employees, to compute the score: an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of the Teletrack scores of first-time payday loan applicants on the de-
mographic and background variables in Table 1, including a full set of month-
year dummies, yields an R2-value of just .304. This process limits the capacity of 
applicants and clerks to decisively manipulate applications, which increases our 
confidence that AboveThr affects an individual’s future choices only insofar as it 
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affects application approval. In light of these considerations, and following best 
practices for regression-discontinuity implementations, we control for all of the 
available covariates and proceed.
3.3. Regression-Discontinuity Specifications
Using the credit-score discontinuity described in Section 3.2, we estimate the 
effect of payday loan approval on bankruptcy at various horizons (from 1 day to 
27 months) after the first payday loan application.15 Our main outcome of in-
terest, Bankruptcyi, is an indicator for whether payday loan applicant i filed for 
bankruptcy within 1 or 2 years of his or her first payday loan application. We 
consider several specifications, the first of which is an OLS specification:
  b b g d e¢ ¢= + + + + +X0 1(2) .Bankruptcy Approved (Credit Score )i i i i ti if M  (2)
Our main specification is a reduced-form equation:
   b b g d e¢ ¢= + + + + +X0 1(3) .Bankruptcy AboveThr (Credit Score )i i i i ti if M  (3)
Finally, we report instrumental-variables regressions, instrumenting for Ap-
proved in equation (2) with AboveThr.16
Analyses identified from discontinuities generally involve a trade-off as more 
and more data are included around the discontinuity (that is, as the bandwidth 
increases). The additional data reduce sampling noise but potentially introduce 
bias as weight is placed on observations where unobservables may be correlated 
with the outcome.17
We take an agnostic perspective about how to proceed in light of this trade-off, 
demonstrating robustness to a variety of choices. First, we restrict to subsets of 
the data, narrowing to ±.5 and ±.05 standard deviations around the credit- score 
threshold. These bandwidth restrictions result in samples with 31,892 and 3,328 
applicants, respectively. Second, we implement optimal bandwidth estimates fol-
15 The last payday loan applications in the administrative data set occur in August 2004, and we 
study bankruptcies through the end of 2006, so at least 27 months of outcome data are available for 
all applicants.
16 Throughout the paper, we focus on identification from first applications. In principle, more 
power would be available if our first stage included all applications. However, there is more slippage 
between AboveThr and application approval after the first loan application: the lender is more likely 
to have a history for a repeat applicant that informs its approval choice. In addition, the regression 
results reported above indicate that we already have considerable power in the first stage, and using 
all applications would require correcting for intra-applicant correlation structure in the effect of 
AboveThr on application approval and the effect of approval on the outcome variables of interest. 
In principle, it would be possible to replicate the instrumental-variables regressions using a new 
endogenous variable, an indicator for whether an individual has ever had an application approved.
17 The starkness of the trade-off is highlighted in Table OA3. Suppose that instead of studying the 
effect of payday loans on bankruptcy using the discontinuity available in this field environment, we 
could run an experiment that randomly assigned payday-loan access. Table OA3 reports the num-
bers of observations necessary to have the specified probability of detecting various effect sizes at a 
95 percent confidence level. For example, if the expected effect is an increase in the bankruptcy rate 
from 1.5 percent to 2 percent, then for 90 percent power almost exactly the number of observations 
that we have with a .5-standard-deviation bandwidth would be required.
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lowing Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) and Imbens and Kaly-
anaraman (2012). Third, we show how the direction and statistical significance of 
our findings vary for any bandwidth.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Findings
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show how the 2-year bankruptcy rate varies with Credit 
Score in six ways that all suggest that payday loan access increases personal bank-
ruptcy rates. Figure 3A reports the raw bankruptcy rates, where each dot corre-
sponds to one of 40 bins. The averages to the left and right of the threshold are 
2.84 percent and 3.38 percent, respectively, as in Table 3. Smoothed polynomial 
fits are also plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 3B replicates Fig-
ure 3A, except that we use the residuals from a regression of the Bankruptcy indi-
cator on the control variables and the month dummies.
Since filing a bankruptcy petition is such a rare outcome, averaging only 31,892 
× 3 percent/40 = 24 events per bin, some volatility is evident in Figure 3A and 
3B. Figure 4, before plotting, takes the cumulative sum of bankruptcy events (4A) 
and residuals (4B) from left to right and plots that cumulative sum against Credit 
Score. For a binary outcome variable like a bankruptcy indicator, a regression 
discontinuity in levels corresponds to a regression kink in the cumulative sum, so 
an effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy is present if the slope differs across 
the threshold in Figure 4.
Figure 5 again shows the cumulative sums of bankruptcy events and residu-
als, but with the horizontal axis as the applicant’s Credit Score rank. Figure 5A 
and 5B show all of the observations below the threshold and an equal number 
of observations above the threshold, respectively. Again, an effect of payday loan 
access on bankruptcy rates would appear as a change in slope at the threshold.
4.2. Conventional Regression-Discontinuity Results
Tables 2 and 3, along with Figures 3–5, suggest that payday loan access in-
creases bankruptcy rates. We formalize and quantify first by estimating equations 
(2) and (3) in Table 4. Regressions report point estimates and standard errors of 
β1 for bankruptcies at 1- and 2-year time horizons since the first loan application. 
Each point estimate in Table 4 is from a different regression. The outcome vari-
ables are multiplied by 100, so the coefficients can be interpreted as the increase 
in bankruptcies in percentage points associated with unit increases in the inde-
pendent variables. 
Section 3 demonstrates that a large share of the variation in Approved can be 
explained by AboveThr, the indicator for whether the credit score is above the 
lender-defined threshold. To the extent that individual characteristics cause slip-
page between AboveThr and loan approval, correlation between those character-
istics and propensity or ability to declare bankruptcy (for example, if loan ap-
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Figure 3. Probability of bankruptcy within 2 years. A, Raw bankruptcy rates; B, residualized 
bankruptcy rates.
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Figure 4. Cumulative bankruptcies within 2 years. A, Raw cumulative bankruptcies; B, re-
sidualized cumulative bankruptcies.
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Figure 5. Cumulative bankruptcies within 2 years: ranked scores. A, Raw cumulative bank-
ruptcies; B, residualized cumulative bankruptcies.
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proval is correlated with resourcefulness in filling out paperwork, which is also 
necessary for completing a bankruptcy filing) could bias even the restricted-range 
OLS estimates. We can more cleanly estimate the causal impact of payday loan 
access on bankruptcy by putting AboveThr on the right-hand side, as in equation 
(3). Controlling for f(Credit Score), Xi, and the month of application as well, we 
obtain the results in columns 4–6 of Table 4.18
Table 4 also shows that the reduced-form effect of AboveThr on bankruptcies 
is significant at the 5 percent level for the .5-standard-deviation sample. Having a 
credit score above the passing threshold increases bankruptcies by 2.289 percent-
age points over 1 year, more than a doubling of the baseline rate of 1.864 percent. 
Standard errors grow large when we restrict to .05 standard deviations on either 
side of the threshold.
In columns 7–9 we instrument for Approved with AboveThr. As we would 
expect given the tight relationship between Approved and AboveThr reported 
above, these regressions are nearly identical to the reduced-form values in mag-
nitude and significance. Effects for bankruptcies 2 years after the first payday loan 
are generally larger than the 1-year effects, statistically and economically.
4.3. Alternative Specifications
In six important ways, this section evaluates the directional and quantitative 
robustness of our conclusions. First, in Table 5 we employ the optimal band-
width approaches of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, 2014b) and Im-
bens and Kalyanaraman (2012), which formally balance the increased precision 
from additional data with the possible introduction of correlation in unobserv-
ables. Optimal bandwidths implied by these procedures tend to be larger than 
the ±.5- standard- deviation windows adopted above, which imply numbers of 
observations greater than 31,892. Coefficients from the optimal bandwidth spec-
ifications tend to be smaller in magnitude but more highly statistically significant 
than the conventional regressions in Section 4.2. Robust estimated effects on the 
2-year bankruptcy rate range from .690 to 1.858 percentage points and are gener-
ally significant at the 1 percent level.
Second, we consider alternative functional forms for f(∙) and the error struc-
ture. Instead of a quartic in Credit Scorei interacted with AboveThri, we try cu-
bics, quadratics, and linear functions interacted with AboveThri and quartics, cu-
bics, quadratics, and linear functions not interacted with AboveThri. Relatedly, 
instead of linear probability models, we implement probit models. Most of the 
coefficients in these specifications, reported in the Tables OA5–OA8, go in the 
same direction and are similarly significant.
Third, we examine robustness with respect to the bandwidth and the functional 
form of f(Credit Scorei) by plotting point estimates and confidence intervals as 
18 The full regression results for these three specifications may be found in Table OA4. Beyond our 
coefficient of interest, a few other covariates are of note. There are statistically significant and posi-
tive coefficients on homeownership, checking account balance, job tenure, and monthly pay.
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a function of the bandwidth in Figure 6A (independent quartic functions) and 
6B (independent linear functions). The horizontal axis is the bandwidth in stan-
dard deviations around the credit-score approval threshold: smaller bandwidths 
restrict attention to smaller intervals around the threshold, so data points to the 
left are noisier than those to the right, which include more data. Figure 6A and 
6B shows statistically significant effects for almost any interval around the thresh-
old from ±.4 standard deviations to ±1 standard deviation. To our knowledge, 
it is an innovation in the literature to demonstrate robustness of regression- 
discontinuity estimates in this fashion.
Fourth, in Figure 7 and associated Table OA9, we show the results of Cox pro-
portional hazard regressions. These specifications incorporate information not 
only about whether a payday loan applicant files for bankruptcy but also about 
how quickly he or she does so after the payday loan application. Again, we find 
statistically and economically significant evidence that payday loan access in-
creases bankruptcy- filing rates as shown by the difference in cumulative hazard 
rates for those above and below the passing credit-score threshold.
Fifth, to the extent possible, we examine heterogeneity across the credit-score 
distribution. The credit-scoring formula and the threshold for approval were ad-
justed at the lender’s storefronts only once each during our period of observation. 
On November 12, 2002, the lender began receiving credit scores from Teletrack 
based on a new formula with a lower mean and variance. Exactly 3 months ear-
lier, the company had reduced the approval threshold by two-thirds of a standard 
deviation. The resulting approval rates for applications prior to August 12, 2002, 
between August 12 and November 11, 2002, and from November 12, 2002, on-
ward were 85.2 percent, 94.6 percent, and 79.1 percent, respectively. For appli-
cants within .5 standard deviations of the threshold, the approval rates during 
the three periods were 82.7 percent, 79.0 percent, and 52.1 percent, respectively. 
About three-fifths of the available observations are from the period after Novem-
ber 12, 2002, because the lender’s business was growing rapidly, so power is lim-
ited when estimating treatment effects without that period. Table OA10 shows 
that the results are less precise but statistically indistinguishable in each period 
when identified separately off these several points in the Credit Score distribu-
tion.19
Sixth, the results reported above rely on data from a single payday lender, 
though applicants rejected by that firm might be able to obtain payday loans else-
where. This means that the estimates represent a lower bound on the true effect 
of payday loan access on bankruptcy. Qualitatively, we expect the size of the un-
derestimate to be moderate for two reasons. First, during our sample period most 
major payday lenders used Teletrack to provide information about loan appli-
cants. Each lender, however, chooses its own rule for approving loan applications 
(and may use a smoother decision rule), and we lack information about those 
19 Regardless of this demonstration of robustness, we agree with Karlan and Zinman (2010) that it 
is particularly valuable to study the effects of credit access on marginally approved borrowers since 
they are likely to be the first borrowers affected by changes in policy or lenders’ choices.
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Figure 6. Effect of payday loans on bankruptcy as a function of bandwidths. A, Independent 
quartic function; B, independent linear function.
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Figure 7. Effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy hazards
practices.20 If all lenders choose exactly the same threshold, our estimated coef-
ficients will not reflect bias due to substitution opportunities. To the extent that 
the firms have comparable costs (Flannery and Samolyk 2005) and the industry is 
competitive (Skiba and Tobacman 2008), they would adopt identical thresholds 
in equilibrium. We also suspect that the underestimation of the effect of payday 
loan approval on bankruptcy is small because the company’s loans remain attrac-
tive to rejected applicants. Of the 20 percent of applicants who were first rejected, 
48 percent reapplied. Only 9 percent of reapplicants were approved, but those 
who were approved borrowed on average $2,485 and paid $415 in interest, sim-
ilar to initially approved applicants who cumulatively borrowed $2,793 and paid 
$477 in interest.
Moving beyond those essentially speculative considerations, we attempt to 
quantify the possible bias due to outside borrowing opportunities. Table 6 re-
veals how the estimated treatment effects vary with proxies for the lender’s zip-
code-level market share. Local market share is proxied as follows. For each new 
applicant, we count the number of the company’s stores visited by applicants re-
siding in the new applicant’s zip code. We divide this number by the Census Bu-
reau’s ZIP Codes Business Patterns’ year-specific count of establishments with 
North American Industry Classification System codes 522291 and 522390 (Bhu-
tta 2014). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that, as expected, the results atten-
uate when the lender has a low (below-median) market share, though the stan-
dard error on the point estimate in column 1 is large. The estimates in column 3 
20 Endogeneity of the approval decision rules does not matter for our estimates. The distribution 
of credit scores is smooth near the credit-score approval threshold, as shown in Figure 1.
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are from regressions interacting AboveThr with the market-share proxy.21 In the 
high-market-share zip codes, we estimate effects of payday loan access that are 
large and significant at both 1- and 2-year horizons.22
Considering this collection of six tests together, we find that the positive ef-
fect of payday loan access on bankruptcy appears robust to optimal bandwidth 
algorithms, the functional form of the relationship with the credit score, many 
reasonable bandwidth choices, analysis using hazard models, the location of the 
threshold in the credit-score distribution, and the degree of competition in the 
local payday-lending market. Next we investigate the mechanisms that could give 
rise to this economically and statistically large effect.
21 The coefficient on the interaction term in column 3 is statistically insignificant, but the main 
effect is close to the N-weighted average of the point estimates in columns 1 and 2.
22 Applicants further below the threshold are less likely to be able to successfully reapply at a com-
peting payday lender. Regressions with larger bandwidths, which include individuals with very low 
scores, will suffer less from this source of attenuation bias.
Table 6
Effects of Payday Loan Approval on Bankruptcy  
Filings by Market Structure
Low  
Ratio
(1)
High  
Ratio
(2)
Interacted 
Ratios
(3)
1 Year:
 AboveThr .302 2.592* 2.102*
(1.941) (1.129) (1.000)
 AboveThr × Company Store Ratio .029
(.038)
2 Years:
 AboveThr .896 3.287* 2.635+
(2.546) (1.536) (1.355)
 AboveThr × Company Store Ratio .065
(.052)
N 5,785 25,972 31,757
Company Store Ratio <1 ≥1
Note. Results are estimated reduced-form effects on bankruptcy filings, in per-
centage points, with standard errors in parentheses. The sample is restricted 
to a ±.5-standard-deviation range around the credit-score threshold. Ratios 
of company stores in the borrower’s home zip code to the number of estab-
lishments in that zip code are from the Census Bureau’s ZIP Codes Business 
Patterns, with North American Industry Classification System codes of 522291 
and 522390. All regressions include a quartic in the credit score interacted with 
the above-threshold dummy, demographic controls, and a full set of dummies 
for month of loan application. Demographic control variables and dummies 
for their missing values are included.
+ P < .1.
* P < .05.
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5. Mechanisms
The typical payday loan is quite small: in our data set the mean and median 
principal amounts are approximately $300. This section investigates the interest-
ing question of how access to these loans can impact a cumulative financial out-
come like bankruptcy.
5.1. Assets and Liabilities of Bankruptcy Filers
Debtors filing for bankruptcy protection must provide the court with sched-
ules of detailed information documenting their assets and liabilities.23 This infor-
mation is publicly available in PACER. We hand coded the data for a threshold 
sample of the 100 post-payday-application bankruptcy filers closest to the credit- 
score threshold on each side, plus those with equal scores at the endpoints.24 
 Table 7 reports summary information about their balance sheets.
Substantial empirical support has been found for strategic default to escape 
outstanding obligations, at least in the sense that debtors’ pecuniary incentives 
to file correlate strongly with bankruptcy propensities. Fay, Hurst, and White 
(2002) find that each $1,000 increase in the financial benefit of a bankruptcy fil-
ing increased the predicted probability of such a filing by .021 of a percentage 
point. Domowitz and Sartain (1999) and Gross and Souleles (2002) provide ev-
idence that higher credit card debt predicts higher probabilities of bankruptcy, 
and White (2007) elaborates on this with supportive evidence.
The balance sheet data in Table 7 show substantial unsecured liabilities, with a 
mean of $27,880, which indicates considerable possible financial benefit from a 
bankruptcy filing. However, by the time of the observed filings, the median ap-
proved borrower had no payday loan debt outstanding from the company that 
supplied our data. Thus, strategic default to escape outstanding payday loan bal-
ances does not appear to be directly implicated as the mechanism driving our 
results.
5.2. Short-Run Responses
The empirical analysis above focuses on the cumulative effect of payday loan 
access until 1 or 2 years after the first loan application. Some evidence on the de-
terminants of bankruptcy points to motives that would induce shorter-run effects 
of credit access. First, applicants might (erroneously) believe that imminent debt 
erasure means it would be to their advantage to borrow as much as possible prior 
to a filing. Bankruptcy courts generally do not tolerate such short-run abuse of 
bankruptcy protection; regardless, the evidence from filers’ balance sheets sug-
gests that many payday loans are repaid or written off by the time of filing, which 
raises the question of how payday loans cause bankruptcy. Figure 8 reports point 
23 Debts not listed on the petition will not be discharged, and misrepresentation on the petition is 
grounds for dismissal, so debtors have strong incentives to be comprehensive.
24 This resulted in review of 211 filings, 104 below the threshold and 107 above.
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Table 7
Payday Loan Applicants’ Assets and  
Liabilities in Bankruptcy
Below 
Threshold
Above 
Threshold
Total assets:
 Mean 105,905 131,149
 Median 105,784 125,788
 SD 83,156 80,009
Personal property:
 Mean 67,249 85,408
 Median 60,300 82,620
 SD 67,463 59,081
Real property:
 Mean 20,802 20,772
 Median 17,432 15,046
 SD 17,252 18,243
Liabilities:
 Mean 110,581 116,513
 Median 87,560 99,094
 SD 85,524 75,514
Secured debt:
 Mean 82,543 88,786
 Median 72,994 77,310
 SD 78,995 63,228
Unsecured debt:
 Mean 28,037 27,726
 Median 16,868 17,480
 SD 29,988 30,208
Company payday debt:
 Mean 11 159
 Median 0 0
 SD 66 335
Other payday debt:
 Mean 41 88
 Median 0 0
 SD 179 285
Note. Results, in dollars, are from bankruptcy petition fil-
ings for 211 payday loan applicants (104 below and 107 
above the passing credit score threshold) who filed for 
bankruptcy after their first payday loan application. The 
samples are not exactly balanced because of ties in scores. 
Data are from the Public Access to Court Electronic Re-
cords data base matched to records from a payday loan 
company. 
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Figure 8. Long-run effects of payday loans on bankruptcies
estimates of the effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy filing on time hori-
zons from several days to several years. It confirms that the directional effects 
are robust to the time horizon we examine, and it displays no disproportionate 
short-run response. Estimated coefficients are from the reduced-form specifica-
tion, equation (3), with ±.5-standard-deviation windows around the threshold.
A second possible reason that payday loan access could have a short-run effect 
on bankruptcy concerns filing fees. Mann and Porter (2010) argue that filing fees 
affect the chapter of a bankruptcy filing. Gross, Notowidigdo, and Wang (2014) 
use a natural experiment to estimate the impact of positive liquidity shocks on 
filing rates. They find large very short-run effects, which supports the view that 
sometimes liquidity infusions can be used to pay filing fees. Together, the balance 
sheet information shown in Table 7 and the estimates at various time horizons 
reported in Table 6 and Figure 8 suggest that a different mechanism is more likely 
to give rise to the effect of payday loan access on bankruptcy.
5.3. Subsequent Payday Loan Borrowing and the Cash Flow Hypothesis
This section investigates the possibility that payday loan access increases the 
personal bankruptcy rate via household cash flow. Table 8 reports the effect of 
payday loan access on number of applications, total dollar amount borrowed, 
and total finance charges at the lender. Here we use the same regression speci-
fications as our main results in Table 4. Approval for one payday loan evidently 
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results in substantial follow-on activity. The reduced-form regression with range 
restricted to ±.5 standard deviations implies that the approval of a first-time pay-
day loan application results in an average of 5.1 more payday loan applications 
at the company within the next year. Borrowing is increased by $1,837 over that 
1-year horizon, while finance charges paid to the company increase by $298 over 
the same period. These results are all significant at the 1 percent level.
The effect on finance charges speaks most clearly to the mechanism behind the 
bankruptcy effect. Suppose bankruptcy filers’ unsecured debt carries a 15 percent 
APR.25 Then, drawing again on data from Table 7, we find that, over the first year 
after a payday loan application, the interest burden from payday loans would 
have averaged $298/($27,880 × 15 percent) = 7 percent of those individuals’ an-
nual liquid debt interest burden.26 Moreover, credit card debt service might be 
easier to postpone, for example, by remitting only a minimum payment. This 7 
percent increase in the debt-related household cash flow burden could suffice to 
tip financially stressed payday loan applicants into bankruptcy.
5.4. Collections Pressure and the Automatic Stay
One complementary possibility is that payday loan borrowing and default re-
sults in increased collections activity,27 and the collections activity motivates 
dunned borrowers to seek protection via the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay. 
The automatic stay prohibits any collections activity by creditors holding secured 
and unsecured claims. Over half of the borrowers in our data have a payday loan 
that results in a bounced check within 1 year of their first loan, and over 30 per-
cent have a loan that is written off and sold to a collection agency, so avoiding 
collections pressure is plausibly an important motive.
We investigate this hypothesized mechanism in Figure 9 and Online Appen-
dix Figures OA9–OA11. Figure 9 plots the daily rates of default on payday loans, 
measured by bouncing of the postdated check, versus the number of days from 
the bankruptcy-filing date to the loan due date. (Loans due before the filing date 
appear to the left of 0.) The figures have two main features, and they give rise to a 
two-part interpretation. First, bounced checks are common for this population: 
among loans due within 100 days of the bankruptcy filing, over 10 percent re-
25 The Federal Reserve’s G19 data series on consumer credit implies a debt-weighted average 
nominal interest rate on credit card debt of about 15 percent. This could imply an underestimate 
of the liquid debt service burden for payday loan applicants if they have higher-rate cards or dis-
proportionately pay penalty interest rates, or it could be an overestimate if payday loan borrowers 
disproportionately let interest accrue while making small payments and then eventually default at 
high rates on their credit cards.
26 Almost identically, elsewhere we report median scheduled minimum debt payments (includ-
ing principal and interest) for the population of payday loan applicants of $4,000 per year (Bhutta, 
Skiba, and Tobacman 2015).
27 It is possible that the payday lender or the third party are aggressive in collections practices, 
though threatening physical harm is prohibited by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. We found 
no published papers quantifying such threats, although of course it could be possible. We under-
stand that the payday lender’s internal collections department attempts to collect on the debt for a 
few weeks and then sells the debt to a third-party collection agency.
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sult in bounced checks. If desire for an automatic stay motivates the bankruptcy 
filing, borrowers apparently wait a long time after payday-related collections ac-
tivity begins before they complete their bankruptcy filings, and defaults continue 
to occur after the filings. Second, within a week of the bankruptcy filing on ei-
ther side, bounced-check rates abruptly and briefly spike above 30 percent. It is 
possible that those filers coordinated the timing of their bankruptcy filings and 
bounced checks so as to minimize the duration of default-related collections ac-
tivity. Of course, it is also possible that broader financial distress brought about 
by both the payday loan default and the bankruptcy filing and/or the advice given 
by the payday borrowers’ bankruptcy lawyers resulted in coordinated timing of 
these events.28
28 Figures OA9–OA11 complement this evidence. They show that many borrowers would have 
benefited from the automatic stay long before their bankruptcy filings, while some were newly ex-
posed to collections activity right before their filings. Figures OA9–OA11 also show similar patterns 
for collections by the payday lender and collections by whoever buys the delinquent debt after 90 
days of internal collections.
Figure 9. Payday loan default rates around the bankruptcy filing date
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6. Discussion
6.1. Interpretation and Related Literature
Our findings complement and extend the rich but unsettled literatures on the 
effects of payday loan access and the causes of bankruptcy filings, which we dis-
cuss in turn. Research on the impact of payday loans comes to disparate con-
clusions (Caskey 2012). Zinman (2010), Morse (2011), and Carter and Skimmy-
horn (2017) generally find beneficial consequences of payday loan access. Carrell 
and Zinman (2014), Melzer (2011), and Campbell, Martínez-Jerez, and Tufano 
(2012) generally find the opposite. Lefgren and McIntyre (2009), Morgan, Strain, 
and Seblani (2012), Bhutta (2014), and Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015) ob-
tain null or mixed effects.
Many forces could give rise to this diversity of findings, from variation in the 
source of identification to differences in the affected populations. Three papers 
are particularly close to ours. Elsewhere, we use the same identification strategy 
and examine effects on variables reported to a prime credit bureau (Bhutta, Skiba, 
and Tobacman 2015). We find economically small effects on credit scores, bal-
ances, and delinquencies, but the standard errors are large enough to be com-
patible with the effects on bankruptcy that we document here.29 In addition, we 
show that our sample of payday loan applicants was experiencing longstanding 
financial distress at the time of their first payday loan applications, with low avail-
ability of credit cards, high rates of recent delinquencies, and credit scores that 
had on average fallen into the bottom quartile of the national distribution for at 
least 5 years.
Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) investigate the relationship between cross- 
sectional geographic characteristics and bankruptcy rates, using state-level and 
zip-code-level variation. Their striking primary results concern wage garnish-
ment rules, household characteristics, and legal culture, with effects of wage gar-
nishment restrictions amounting to 42 percent of baseline bankruptcy rates. In 
addition, they report a statistically insignificant but positive relationship between 
legal payday lending in a state and bankruptcy rates. Payday loan access raises the 
state rate by .12 bankruptcies per thousand residents off a baseline rate of 4.46. 
Morgan, Strain, and Seblani (2012), working with state-year variation in pay-
day loan bans and difference-in-difference regressions, estimate that bans reduce 
Chapter 13 filing rates by between one-sixth and one-third.
If payday loan bans affect bankruptcy propensities only for payday loan bor-
rowers, and the payday loan borrowing rate in states without bans is 10 percent, 
then the quantitative findings in Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) and Morgan, 
Strain, and Seblani (2012) should be scaled up by an order of magnitude to com-
pare with our findings here, since we estimate effects only on payday loan appli-
cants. This rescaling would imply effect sizes of 1.2 bankruptcies (Lefgren and 
29 In Bhutta, Skiba, and Tobacman (2015), we do not examine bankruptcy as an outcome because 
of data limitations: bankruptcy flags appear with irregular timing in the matched credit bureau data, 
and our strategy to match multiple data sets resulted in a sample with too few bankruptcy filings.
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McIntyre 2009) and .48–.93 Chapter 13 bankruptcies (Morgan, Strain, and Se-
blani 2012) per thousand payday loan applicants, smaller than our findings here 
but of the same order of magnitude.
6.2. Welfare Implications
The welfare effects of the indebtedness and bankruptcies resulting from access 
to payday loans are difficult to measure and could in principle be positive or neg-
ative. Since bankruptcy is a form of social insurance, the net social costs may lie 
in transactions costs and externalities elsewhere in the credit markets. In particu-
lar, access to payday loans may cause other unsecured debt to become uncollect-
able, which drives up equilibrium interest rates on other forms of credit.
One window into the private costs and benefits of bankruptcy filing is provided 
by the chapter of filing and the disposition of the case. Many of the benefits of a 
Chapter 13 filing accrue only if and when the associated payment plan is com-
pleted and remaining debts are discharged.30 Chapter 13 filers often instead have 
their cases dismissed (or converted to Chapter 7) prior to discharge for failure to 
keep up the regular payments toward a Chapter 13 plan. Dobbie and Song (2015) 
find that completing a Chapter 13 plan and thus discharging remaining debts rel-
ative to filing for Chapter 13 and having the case dismissed improves subsequent 
earnings and lowers mortality rates.
We test for differential effects by bankruptcy chapter (7, 13, or 13 and dis-
missed) in Table 9. Columns 1–4 report estimated treatment effects analogous 
to those in Table 4. Columns 1 and 2 show a significant impact of payday loan 
access on Chapter 13 but not on Chapter 7 filings. Columns 3 and 4 show that the 
effect on Chapter 13 filings is primarily attributable to cases that were dismissed.
Similar results appear for the multinomial logit specifications, which respect 
more of the structure of the debtor’s choice environment. For various sets of con-
trols, the estimates are most reliably statistically significant for Chapter 13 filings 
that are eventually dismissed. However, all of the point estimates for effects on 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy are also positive, and the standard errors are always large 
enough that we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that the 7, 13, and 13 and 
dismissed estimates are the same.31
One other possible window into welfare implications is provided by anal-
ysis of heterogeneous treatment effects. Table OA14 reports estimates by gen-
der, race, and homeownership status from the reduced-form specification with 
a ±.5- standard-deviation credit-score range. Column 1 repeats the benchmark 
numbers from regression results in Table 4 for comparison. In the other columns, 
sample sizes shrink so standard errors are large and no effects are statistically sig-
nificant. Column 12 examines effects on service members, because of concerns 
by regulators, elected representatives, and the Department of Defense (2006) that 
30 We are very grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point and suggesting the 
following analysis.
31 Tables OA11–OA13 report optimal bandwidth version of the regressions in Table 9, analogous 
to those in Table 5, for Chapter 7 filings, Chapter 13 filings, and Chapter 13 filings that were eventu-
ally dismissed. Figures OA3–OA8 similarly replicate the main figures.
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payday loans disproportionately affect military personnel.32 We estimate an eco-
nomically large positive effect of payday loans on service members’ bankruptcies, 
which (not surprising given the small sample) is statistically insignificant.
More broadly, Han and Li (2011) show that the available terms of borrowing 
are worse (for example, credit card interest rates are higher by 116 basis points) 
for households that have filed for bankruptcy than households that have not. Sim-
ilarly, Han, Keys, and Li (2011) find that direct-mail credit card offers generally 
worsen for recent bankruptcy filers. These empirical results combine the effect of 
whatever led to the bankruptcy filing with the effect of the bankruptcy filing itself. 
Dobbie and Song (2015) and Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Yang (2017) fo-
cus on the quasi-experimental effect of a Chapter 13 filing alone and find it to be 
highly beneficial, reducing foreclosure rates, mortality, civil judgments, and re-
possessions and increasing earnings, homeownership, and credit scores.
Taken together, the related literature and our estimates carry the following in-
terpretation. The bankruptcy filings induced by payday loan access cause other 
debt to become uncollectable for these borrowers, which may cause interest rates 
to rise for other ex ante indistinguishable borrowers, so the externalities are un-
likely to be positive. The net private costs are difficult to ascertain, but it appears 
that the payday applicants induced to file for bankruptcy receive benefits from its 
social insurance aspects that are toward the low end. Regardless, a bankruptcy fil-
ing is a rare but interesting and high-consequence indicator of financial distress.
7. Conclusion
We find that payday loan applicants barely approved for their first loans file for 
bankruptcy protection significantly more often than barely rejected first-time ap-
plicants. The magnitude of the effect is economically nontrivial, representing an 
increase of about 1 percentage point in the bankruptcy-filing rate. Opportunities 
for rejected applicants to substitute with credit elsewhere (Carter 2015;  Bhutta, 
Goldin, and Homonoff 2016) imply that our quantitative findings are lower 
bounds on the true effects, but by estimating the effects as a function of this firm’s 
zip-code-level market share, we document that the bias is likely to be small.
Equally importantly, we evaluate four major candidate mechanisms for the in-
crease in bankruptcy rates. We find the most support for a mechanism that to 
our knowledge is novel in the literature, that is, reductions in household cash 
flow due to the debt service burden. Taken together, our results are consistent 
with the view that payday loans exacerbate financial distress and that household 
cash flow should be more intensively explored as a driver of bankruptcy-filing 
decisions. First-time payday loan approval causes significant additional high- 
interest-rate borrowing, and the consequent interest burden may worsen house-
32 We code an applicant as a member of the military if (ignoring capitalization) his or her em-
ployer name contains “Marines,” “Marine Corps,” “Air Force,” “USAF,” or “Army” but not “Salv” 
or if it contains “Navy” but not “Old Navy.” This yields 2,332 service member observations in the 
full data set and 638 observations in the 31,892 observations within .5 standard deviations of the 
threshold.
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hold cash flow sufficiently to induce bankruptcy. The bankruptcies that result are 
often dismissed Chapter 13 filings that do not result in a discharge, providing less 
benefit to the debtors. The welfare implications of our empirical findings depend 
on difficult- to-estimate parameters like the private and social net costs of bank-
ruptcy filings.
Our research also informs the ongoing public debate related to payday loan 
regulation. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a payday loan rule 
requiring lenders to “reasonably determine that the consumer has the ability to 
repay the loan” (12 C.F.R. sec. 1041 [2017]). The date for lenders to comply with 
these rules was set for August 2019. The current administration suspended the 
rule indefinitely before implementation and, in the spring of 2019, proposed roll-
ing back that portion of the final payday regulation rule. Our findings contribute 
to the body of research that policy makers may consider in moving forward with 
the regulation of payday loans. We hope that these findings, and the questions 
they raise, advance ongoing discussion about payday lending and the determi-
nants of bankruptcy.
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